Building a Culture of Safety

Military Air Safety Workshop

RDML Chris Murray

Commander, Naval Safety Center

Moving from Reactive to Proactive

- NAVIG inspection of Naval Safety Center in 2014 identified:
  - Aviation-centric organization
  - Need to expand afloat manning and expertise
  - Inefficient lessons learned and hazard information sharing
  - Inconsistent rigor in mishap investigations, especially between communities
- NAVSAFECEN mission greatly expanded in 2014 with Fleet Safety Campaign
  - Mandate to improve safety culture Fleet-wide

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Moving from Reactive to Proactive

- NAVSAFECEN Internal “Stand Down”
  - Two-week operational pause in March 2015 to evaluate our methods, products, and services to the Navy and Marine Corps
  - Goals of the stand down were to identify ways to:
    - Evaluate overall safety culture, not simply procedural compliance
    - Become more efficient and responsive to customers’ needs for information
    - Increase analytical bandwidth and identify issues and trends
    - Reenergize ORM
    - Increase the ease and speed of information sharing

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Moving from Reactive to Proactive

- NAVSAFECEN embarked on a transformation process shaped by
  - Internal reorganization
    - New departments and divisions created, personnel resources realigned
  - External communication
    - More interaction with our Echelon II customers to determine their needs

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Transformation

- Assessments
  - Focus on ISICs as well as individual units
  - ISIC and TYCOM now receive feedback
    - Previously, results were only given to unit CO
  - Culture-focused rather than compliance-centric
    - Successfully integrated with INSURV/TYCOM oversight teams to ensure compliance is still measured
    - Use standardized culture assessment tools
  - Assessing during operationally significant periods when possible

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Transformation

- Shore Establishment Assessments
  - Major gap exists – previously not assessed for safety
  - Methodology in place to assess these shore commands
  - Beta tests have revealed potentially significant issues and ORM gaps
  - Requires more civilian resources to fully implement
  - Working to develop cost projections and an implementation plan

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Transformation

- Improving Investigative Rigor
  - Established an Investigations Department
    - Previously, investigators were part of community-specific directorates, meaning differences in methodology and resources for investigations
  - Standardized training
    - Ensures afloat or motor vehicle investigators have the same tools and skills as aviation investigators
  - Hiring Afloat Civilian Investigator
    - Aviation has long had civilian investigators who provide consistency and knowledge
    - Afloat will now have that continuity

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Transformation

- Improving Lessons Learned dissemination
  - Established a Lessons Learned Division
  - Created process to deliver sanitized reports quickly to customers
  - Establishing redundant methods to distribute this information
    - “High Velocity Learning” Cross-Functional Team studying ways to use mobile devices
  - Working through JSSC Forums to ensure lessons learned with joint applicability are communicated
    - Permanent JSSC Lessons Learned working group is currently under consideration

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Transformation

- Operational Risk Management (ORM)
  - ORM became a stand-alone department rather than a division within Aviation Directorate
    - Recognizes the reality that ORM applies to everyone
  - Internal reorganization to fortify ORM staff with additional personnel, resources
  - Working with Fleet partners to address their concerns with ORM training content and delivery
  - Addressing the gap of ORM in high-level planning processes and within joint and multi-unit exercises
    - ORM training for senior leaders

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Transformation

- Improving analysis of safety data
  - Began delivering Quarterly Analysis Reports to the Fleet in January 2015
  - Expanded to include Shore Infrastructure/SYSCOM analysis at VCNO's direction in April 2015
  - Also includes limited USMC information
- New mentality – Everyone is an analyst first
- Working to ensure the results of this analysis reach the intended audiences in a timely manner

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Streamlined Endorsements

- Investigation reports take up to 18 months to complete the endorsement process
  - High level support for reducing this time frame
- Proposal
  - Unit CO will always endorse a mishap investigation first
  - TYCOMs can shape the endorsement process to follow
    - Allow follow-on endorsers to provide concurrent feedback
- Highlighting languishing Engineering Investigations to speed up report release

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Safety Investigation Report

- Reports averaged 45 pages
  - Difficult to find important recommendations and findings
  - Contributed to lengthy endorsement process
- New summary report is 4 pages
  - Executive summary of the most important hazard and causal information
  - Beta tests within aviation have been very well received

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Shaping Culture

- Fleet Safety Campaign
  - Fleet Operational Safety Council
    - Forum to share information and address FRAGO tasking
    - Quickly address community concerns
- Campaign Expansion
  - Safety Quality Council
    - Echelon II shore establishment forum
    - Exploring ways to improve culture across the Navy, not just in operational units

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Way Ahead

- Expand analysis capabilities
  - Focus on Hazards
    - How are they controlled?
    - Are the controls effective?
  - Aviation is the test subject
    - Most transparent reporting culture
    - Accurate data
  - Expand to other communities
    - Prove that transparent reporting leads to hazard identification
    - Hazard ID first step in developing successful controls
    - Once controlled successfully, repeat mishaps will go down

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Questions/Discussion

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